

Note DDI:

SEN. JACKSON
JT. HEARING
8 Nov 67

Sen Stennis *
Sen Symington *
Sen Smith *

Sen Jackson
Sen Pastore
Sen Aiken
Rep Holifield
Rep Young
Rep Price
Rep Bates
Rep Aspinwall
Rep Morris

RUSSELL
SUBCOMMITTEE
17 Nov 67

Sen Russell
Sen Stennis
Sen Symington
Sen Smith
Sen Thurmond
Sen Hayden
Sen Hill
Sen Mundt

Sen Mansfield
Sen Fulbright
Sen Hickenlooper


FULL SEN. ARMED
SVCS COMMITTEE
18 Jan 68

Sen Russell
Sen Stennis
Sen Symington
Sen Smith
Sen Thurmond

Sen Jackson

Sen Ervin
Sen Cannon
Sen Byrd WVa
Sen Young Ohio
Sen Inouye
Sen McIntyre
Sen Brewster
Sen Byrd Va
Sen Miller
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Sen Pearson
Sen Dominick

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10:30, 17 November 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR
CIA SUBCOMMITTEES OF
SENATE ARMED SERVICES AND
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES
("RUSSELL SUBCOMMITTEE")

C O N T E N T S

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Moscow 7 November Parade	7	5:00
The Soviet Navy (Subs, <u>Kresta</u> , "Carriers")	12	10:00
Soviet Advanced Defense Systems	22	13:00
Chinese Advanced Weapons	34	17:00
[Redacted]	49	5:00
Cyprus	54	4:00
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Soviet Resupply of Middle East Arms	62	2:00
[Redacted]	65	6:00

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Uninterrupted Delivery: 72:00 min

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17 November 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR
RUSSELL SUBCOMMITTEE

FOBS

I. In view of all of the recent discussion of the FOBS, or Fractional Orbit Bombardment System, I would like to review for you the hard intelligence we have on this system, and the current status of the program.

(PHOTO, SCRAG IN MAY 1965 PARADE)

II. The discussion of orbital bombardment systems was touched off two and a half years ago, when the Soviets rolled this missile, /the Scrag, / through Moscow in the May Day parade, /and announced that it was a global rocket, capable of hitting any target on earth from any direction. (Khrushchev had boasted of a "global rocket" in March, 1962.)

A. As far as we can determine, Scrag has never flown. We consider it either a mock-up, or a design which did not survive to the flight-testing stage.

B. As a result of the Soviet claims, we discussed the orbital bombardment concept in mid-1965 with this committee and in our publications,

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F. The FOBS could go into operational deployment any time from early 1968 to some time in 1969, [redacted]

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G. The technology and hardware [redacted] could serve as the basis for development of a Multiple Orbit Bombardment System, which would put a weapons payload in orbit and leave it there until a command calls it down on target. We do not believe the Soviets are developing such a system.

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1. A multiple orbit weapon, in contrast to FOBS, is deployed in space, not on the ground; it can be re-targeted as necessary, or recovered if not used against an enemy.

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2. Deployment of even a small force of such weapons, however, would be very costly, and would involve substantial command and control problems. It would also risk serious political as well as military repercussions, especially in periods of high international tension.

3. As for the treaty on peaceful uses of space, the Soviets can perfect both the fractional and multiple orbit vehicles without putting an actual warhead in space.

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The fractional orbit weapon, in any event, would not be launched until the opening of hostilities, and by that time the treaty probably would not give the Soviets much pause.

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MOSCOW
PARADE

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
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MOSCOW PARADE

I. The Moscow parade on November 7th held no particular surprises for us. There were some new weapons

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III. The photograph in the center is an ICBM paraded for the first time. It is probably the big SS-9--the larger of the two third-generation missiles now being deployed.

A. The SS-9 booster is also the launching vehicle for the Fractional Orbit Bombardment system.

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B. The warhead on this ICBM differs in profile from what we would expect the normal SS-9 warhead to look like.

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2. The Soviet commentator remarked that this ICBM uses a "new and highly efficient" propellant, but gave no details. The SS-9 is not solid-fueled.

IV. The weapon in the upper right-hand picture was described by the Soviets as a naval missile for underwater launching.

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B. This may be the missile for the new Soviet Polaris-type submarine which I will discuss a bit later.

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C. The SS-N-5, now being used by the Soviets for submerged launchings from a handful of modified G-class and H-class boats, has a range of 700 miles. It may be this missile, photographed in an earlier parade, which we call SERB.

(REPEAT PHOTO, MISSILES IN 11/7/67 PARADE)

V. The upper left-hand picture shows a two-stage, solid propellant missile on a trailer, apparently of medium or intermediate range. This could be the missile for a mobile IRBM transporter-launcher.

(PHOTO, SCAMP IN EARLIER PARADES)

A. In the parade, the new missile followed immediately behind the Scamp transporter-launcher, which has been appearing in parades since May, 1965.

1. Scamp has always been described as a
solid propellant IRBM.

(PHOTO, SAVAGE IN EARLIER PARADES)

VI. Another old-timer showing up again in the line
of march was the weapon we call the Savage,
which the Soviets have referred to as a
solid-fueled ICBM.

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(REPEAT PHOTOS, MISSILES IN 11/7/67 PARADE)

VII. The pictures at the bottom show two of the new weapons in the parade.

A. At bottom right is a tracked vehicle mounting three anti-aircraft rockets, described as effective at extremely low altitudes.

1. This vehicle probably will have a ground forces support role.

B. At bottom left is a tracked personnel carrier armed with both a conventional gun and what appears to be an anti-tank missile.

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VIII. The Soviet parade also featured this new missile, which is either a tactical or a medium-range strategic surface-to-surface weapon.

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SOVIET
NAVY

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
RUSSELL SUBCOMMITTEE

THE SOVIET NAVY

I. I now want to turn to the Soviet Navy, mainly to bring you up to date on Soviet submarine and surface ship building programs, but also to note that we must recognize a dramatic change in the Soviet Navy over the past few years.

A. This subcommittee, of course, is well aware of the significant developments in naval weaponry---Polaris-type submarines, 250-mile missiles that can be launched against sea targets by either submarines or surface units, and short-range missiles that can sink a destroyer at 15 to 20 miles.

II. Along with this new weaponry, the Soviet Navy has also taken on a new idea of its mission. It is no longer just a defensive force tied to the shores of the U.S.S.R. For the first time in its history, the Soviet Navy is carrying the "hammer and sickle" deep into what were once the private waters of the western navies. The U.S.S.R. is not yet the equal of the United States on the sea, but it clearly intends to offer a direct challenge to us in most, /if not all,/ important sea areas.

III. During the past year, we have identified several new submarine programs in the U.S.S.R. These programs clearly are intended to improve the strategic strike capability of the Soviet navy and also advance toward a more effective anti-submarine capability.

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A. [redacted] the first unit of a new class of ballistic missile submarine

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was identified, [redacted]

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2. While similar to U.S. Polaris submarines, the new Soviet ballistic missile submarine has a significantly larger displacement. The first unit of the new class probably will be operational as a weapon system by mid-1968.

3. We estimate that three or four of these new submarines will be in the fleet by mid-1969.

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4. We expect the new submarine to patrol off the U.S. within missile range.

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B. New torpedo-attack submarines are also now under construction. These are considerably smaller than older Soviet nuclear submarines, and probably are intended to fill the pressing need for a "killer," or anti-submarine submarine. The Soviets may have advanced far enough in submarine and sonar technology to build a unit with significant anti-submarine capability, but we believe that their capability in anti-submarine warfare development underseas is still well behind that of the United States.

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Soviet Surface Ships

V. The Soviet Navy is also improving in surface ship capability. In the past year, several new

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classes of combat ships have entered active service, and since last May the Soviets have maintained a beefed-up naval presence in the Mediterranean. In October, this force was used for the second time to provide visible if belated support to the Egyptians.

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A. Two large helicopter carriers have been built in the Black Sea. These are the units recently and erroneously described in the press as aircraft carriers. The first unit,

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the Moskva, [redacted]

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[redacted] should soon be operational. The second, the Leningrad, [redacted]

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[redacted] should enter fleet service next year.

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1. These ships are equipped with surface-to-air missile launchers, [redacted]

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2. The ships could be used for anti-submarine warfare, or to support amphibious operations. They would also be [redacted]

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useful in recovering manned spacecraft
coming down at sea.

(PHOTO, KRESTA CRUISER)

B. The first unit of the Kresta-class guided
missile cruisers left the Leningrad shipyard
last March.

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The Kresta

also carries surface-to-air missiles and
anti-submarine weapons, and is the first
Soviet warship equipped with a helicopter
hangar. Two Kresta-class units are now

operational,

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1. The surface-to-surface missile carried
by the Kresta-class is probably the SS-N-3,
the winged missile which is surface-launched
by Soviet cruise-missile submarines.

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4. These missiles accordingly offer a significant threat to U.S. and Allied shipping--particularly to carrier forces.

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SOV
DEFENSE

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17 November 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR
RUSSELL SUBCOMMITTEE

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

- I. It has been some time since I had an opportunity to brief you on Soviet Strategic Defense-- particularly on the question of an anti-ballistic missile system.

A. As you recall, ~~when I briefed you last~~ January, there was general agreement that the Soviets are deploying an ABM system around Moscow, but there was considerable controversy over the nature of a second defensive system called the Tallinn system.

- B. Since then, we have obtained much more information

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[redacted] enabling more conclusive evaluation. The pertinent National Intelligence Estimate is now ~~gone through~~ ~~in the final stages of its~~ annual revision. ~~The final version will state~~ much more strongly than last year that the Tallinn system is not an anti-ballistic missile defense but a long-range air defense.

- II. Meanwhile, the ABM defense for Moscow is well along in construction.

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A. Some elements of the system will probably become operational in the course of the next 12 months, and we expect full operational capability by 1971.

1. Moscow is the only Soviet city known to be defended by this system.

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E. The missile for this system is the Galosh,
which has frequently been paraded through
Red Square in its launch canister. We also
have a series of pictures [redacted]

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[redacted] which show the actual launching
from the canister.

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II. We do not believe that the Moscow ABM system

can cope [redacted]

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[redacted] in any all-

out engagement with U.S. ICBMs.

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B. In view of such shortcomings, the Soviets will probably seek to improve the Moscow ABM system or develop a wholly new ABM system before they try to protect other areas from missile attacks.

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IV. Concurrently with the construction of the Moscow defense, the Soviets have been pushing deployment of complexes for the Tallinn system.

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Air Defense

V. The U.S.S.R. has achieved an effective defense against manned bombers at medium and high altitudes, but is still vulnerable to many advanced techniques of air attack and low-altitude bomber penetration.

(MAP, SA-1, SA-2, SA-3 DEPLOYMENT)

A. Soviet defenses include more than 1,000 surface-to-air missile sites, shown on this map, more than 3,500 fighter interceptors, and an extensive radar and control network. The U.S.S.R. is making a concerted effort to improve its capability against the low-level threat, especially for the Western approaches, but this will be a lengthy and costly program, and one not likely to provide complete defense.

(PHOTO, SA-2 MISSILE)

B. The SA-2 missile shown here has been the mainstay of Soviet surface-to-air missile defense for many years. Early versions of this system have been sent to several nations including North Vietnam, Cuba, the UAR, Iraq, India, and Indonesia.

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(PHOTO, SA-3 MISSILE)

C. There are about 100 SA-3 battalions deployed in the Soviet Union for additional low-altitude defense. Recently construction began on about a dozen SA-3 sites in East Germany, indicating that the SA-3 will soon be the second Soviet surface-to-air missile system to go outside the Soviet Union.

VI. Over-all effectiveness of the Soviet interceptor force is improving as new aircraft are being introduced, even though the size of the force is gradually being reduced. Two new interceptors, the Fiddler and the Flagon, began entering operational air defense units in the past year. They are the only known Soviet fighters able to attack enemy aircraft by any other tactic than a tail chase.

(PHOTO, FIDDLER)

A. About 40 heavy Fiddler interceptors are now deployed in the north European U.S.S.R. The Fiddler's long range allows the interceptor to carry out more than one attack per sortie, to hamper the aerial refueling of a bomber off the Soviet coast, and to force bombers to fly at low altitudes far from their targets, thereby reducing the bombers' range.

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(PHOTO, FLAGON)

B. This high-acceleration, point defender, known as Flagon, is the most recent addition to
25X1 the Soviet interceptor force.

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We have also been following the development of several other Soviet aircraft which subsequently made their first public appearances at the recent Moscow Air Show. They are still two years or more away from operational deployment, but two we call Foxbat and Flogger are worth noting:

(PHOTO, FOXBAT)

C.

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we estimate that the Foxbat could have a combat ceiling of 70,000-75,000 feet. The Foxbat could enter service in 1969. The Soviets have recently claimed world altitude and closed-course speed records

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(PHOTO, FLOGGER)

D. This fighter, the swing-wing Flogger, appears to be one of the most promising new design concepts shown in last July's Moscow air show. The Flogger or a variant will probably not be ready for operational units until after 1970.

(CHART, SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY MISSION)

VII. The Soviet Union currently has about 3,200 combat aircraft assigned to its 13 tactical air armies in support of theater ground forces, although only one third are bombers or fighter-bombers.

A. New supersonic fighters and fighter-bombers continue to replace older aircraft in tactical air units, with first priority going to the six Soviet air divisions in East Germany.

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VIII. The mobile Ganef surface-to-air missile system may be starting into deployment this year. It will augment the SA-2 system for defense of Soviet troops against air attack in the field. The Ganef

will give air defense missile forces a better capability for keeping up with fast-moving ground troops. It is also likely to be more effective than the SA-2 against tactical aircraft attacking at very low altitudes.

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CHI, ADV,
WEAPONS

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17 November 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR
RUSSELL SUBCOMMITTEE

CHINESE COMMUNIST ADVANCED WEAPONS

- I. I would also like to bring this subcommittee up to date with a brief review of Chinese Communist advanced weapons. These programs have continued steady progress despite the disruptions accompanying the Cultural Revolution. They are going to extend the military power and political influence of the Chinese Communists far beyond the reach of their conventional forces.
- A. The Chinese have already demonstrated that they are capable of building both fission and thermonuclear weapons.
- B. The Chinese strategic missile program has reached the point where the medium-range ballistic missile may be ready for deployment, and an intercontinental ballistic missile could be ready for initial test firings.

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C. If they can manage their limited resources effectively, they should continue making steady progress toward a missile strike capability.

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- A. China now probably has stockpiled a few fission weapons, deliverable by medium bomber.
1. They have only 14 medium bombers, 12 propeller-driven and two jet.
 2. In addition, the Chinese have about 250 light jet bombers. These planes are obsolescent and have a radius of only about 550 miles. They do, however, represent a threat to areas on the periphery of China.

Delivery Systems

- V. The Chinese are working on at least three and perhaps four delivery systems for nuclear weapons. We believe they have successfully developed an MRBM and could be ready to begin test-firing an ICBM. They may also begin production of a jet medium bomber later this year or early in 1968. In addition, they have one G-class ballistic missile submarine which they launched in 1964.

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C. We believe that the Chinese MRBM is similar in technology to the older Soviet MRBMs. The Chinese probably use storable liquid propellants, such as nitric acid and kerosene.

D. We estimate that the Chinese will begin a limited deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads to the field

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(MAP, POTENTIAL MRBM THREAT)

E. The Chinese MRBM is most likely to have a range up to 1,000 nautical miles. This would give good coverage of the Asian area and much of the Soviet central and far eastern areas.

1. From launch sites located in eastern and southern China, MRBMs can reach all the capitals and industrial complexes of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, The Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, and India. They

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could also reach all of the U.S. bases
in east and southeast Asia.

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B. We expect the Chinese to conduct their initial
Chinese ICBM flight tests within China, al-
though they could conceivably fire an extended-
range test into the Indian Ocean early in the
test program.

(MAP, POTENTIAL ICBM THREAT)

- C. The Chinese would certainly seek a range on the order of 6,000 nautical miles for their ICBM, which would permit them to threaten targets in the U.S., U.S.S.R., and Western Europe.
- D. If the Chinese have reasonable success with their flight test program, we believe they could have a few ICBMs deployed and operational in the early 1970's.

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VIII. As I mentioned earlier, the Chinese have a single ballistic missile submarine, [redacted]

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- A. They may be working on a missile for this submarine--the Soviet version is armed with three [redacted]

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C. As I said earlier, the Chinese have only two jet medium bombers in their inventory. They could begin producing jet medium bombers
(TU-16's) [redacted]
[redacted] late this year or early
in 1968.

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1. Although this is an obsolescent aircraft, it would be adequate for use around the periphery of Communist China. The TU-16 has a combat radius of about 1,600 nautical miles.

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2. By 1972, the Chinese could have about 75
of these bombers in operational units.

D. Our evidence does not indicate that the Chinese
are now developing long-range heavy bombers or
nuclear-powered submarines, although they are
apparently engaged in some of the research
which could lead into nuclear submarine develop-
ment. Work on such systems would require levels
of technology new to the Chinese.

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Strategic Defenses

- I. China is vulnerable to strategic attack by both missiles and bombers, and is likely to remain so for years to come.
- A. We have seen no sign of a development program for antiballistic-missile defenses.
- B. Air defenses, in contrast, have received emphasis second only to the developmental effort on long-range missiles, and have improved steadily in recent years.

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1. About three-fourths of them are obsolete MIG-15s and 17s. Most of the rest are MIG-19s, which China has been producing since 1965.
2. China also has 25 to 35 MIG-21s which it obtained from the Soviets. Chinese production of this aircraft has been anticipated

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II. Supplementing this interceptor force is an embryonic surface-to-air missile deployment.

A. The Chinese received a small supply of SA-2 missiles and equipment from the Soviets before the split. Since then, they have undertaken their own surface-to-air missile development program, and have begun to produce their own versions in limited quantities.

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CYPRUS -

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17 November 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR
RUSSELL SUBCOMMITTEE

CYPRUS

(MAP, CYPRUS)

- I. A tenuous cease-fire has halted serious fighting that erupted in the Ayios Theodoros - Kophinou area of Cyprus on November 15.
- A. Greek and Turkish emotions remain high, however, and further tension and mutual recrimination can be expected to accompany efforts to negotiate a more stable arrangement.
- II. The day-long battle--the most serious in two years--broke out after the Greek Cypriots tried to resume routine police patrols that had been ended last July at Turkish Cypriot insistence.
- A. On November 14, a patrol entered Ayios Theodoros. Turkish Cypriots in the town apparently had no clear orders on what action to take and did not oppose the patrol.
- B. The next day, however, when the patrol attempted to re-enter the town, shooting began and quickly spread northward to Kophinou.
- C. The UN peace force was unable to intercede, and the Greek Cypriot National Guard took control of both areas, overrunning a number of UN observation posts in the process.

Makarios
So came the
(tentative)

D. Twenty-three persons, 12 of them Greeks, reportedly were killed, many others wounded, and a number of buildings destroyed in the fighting.

III. The incident apparently resulted largely because Cypriot armed forces commander General Grivas insisted that the patrols be resumed, by force if necessary.

A. Grivas--the hero of the Greek guerrilla fighting against the British ten years ago--may have seen this course of action as a chance to repair his dwindling prestige in the Greek Cypriot community.

B. President Makarios later told a UN official that he had no idea Grivas planned such a large operation when he gave his general approval to the renewed patrols. He disclaimed knowledge of the patrol that started the fighting. Makarios also placed full blame for the battle on Grivas.

IV. The Greek Government, which has been critical of Grivas' tactics in the past, apparently approved of his plan to resume the patrols.

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- A. It is not clear, however, whether this support heralds some further Greek initiative on the over-all Cyprus problem.
 - B. Whatever its intent, Athens ordered both the cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Greek Cypriot National Guard from the area of fighting.
 - C. The initial order was given by King Constantine, at the urging of the US Ambassador--the junta may be harder-nosed.
- V. Ankara expressed its grave concern--the Turks also focused on Grivas as the villain.
- A: During the fighting, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official warned of possible air action if the issue were not resolved.
 - 1. Another Turkish official stated that Turkish bombers were loaded and ready to take off when word of the cease-fire arrived.

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D. Anti-American demonstrations broke out in Is-
and Ankara
tanbul, on November 16. They were organized
by Turks exploiting continuing sentiment that
the US favors the Greek position in Cyprus.

VI. In general, the Greek and Turkish governments
|| appear to be more agitated than at any time since
the Turkish air strike on Cyprus on 1964.

A. Several previous incidents had already height-
ened tensions.

1. Although more serious than many, the latest
incident is part of a recurring pattern in
Cyprus of fighting and retreats; tension
and negotiation.

C. The clandestine entry into Cyprus of Turkish
Cypriot leader Denktash earlier this month, his
arrest, and his subsequent release also seems to
have contributed to generally strained Greek-
Turkish relations, although the fact that Ma-
karios let him go back to Turkey early this
week was supposed to ease matters.

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ARAB-
ISRAELI

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17 November 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR
RUSSELL SUBCOMMITTEE

THE MIDDLE EAST

When I last met with this subcommittee on May 23,
the Middle East was coming to a boil.

- A. That was 10 days before the fighting started,
but as I recall, I began by remarking that
"an incident, an accident, or a miscalcula-
tion could result in war."
- B. I don't propose to review the fighting, or
all of the incidents and maneuvers since
that time, but I do want to state that we
are far from being out of the woods--either
in the United Nations or along the actual
frontiers in the Middle East.
- I. Tension between the Arabs and the Israelis has
not been reduced, and the probability of incidents
remains high.

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A. At the moment the Arabs are alarmed by reports that the Israelis are deploying troops for a possible attack against Jordan or Syria.

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II. The Arabs' frustration at Israeli occupation of their territory is rapidly increasing, and could spark Arab actions against the Israelis--especially along the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire line.

A. Arab terrorism on the Israeli-occupied Jordan West Bank is likely to increase, thus heightening the danger of an Israeli retaliatory strike at Jordan.

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3. Nasir and Husayn appear to want a political settlement with the Israelis, in order to get Israeli troops out of Arab lands.
 - a. Most Arab states would go along with whatever these two agree upon.
 - b. Several of the Arab states, however, are less conciliatory. Algeria and Iraq would condone a settlement, but not endorse it. The extremist regime in Syria, which is behind the terrorist campaign, probably will not acquiesce in any settlement.
4. Affairs in the Arabian Peninsula seem to be sorting themselves out, at least in a crude fashion.
 - a. The Egyptians are moving out of Yemen, and should be gone by the end of the year. Their troop strength there is believed to be less than 10,000 men.
 - b. A new republican regime has taken over, and is in the process of reaching an accommodation with tribal and royalist elements.

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- c. The new Yemeni Prime Minister is Muhsin al-Aini, the ambassador here in Washington until last year when he resigned in protest over Egyptian domination of the Sallal regime.
- d. In South Arabia, the British are turning the country over to an army-backed regime, and the internal power struggle which has cost so many lives has died down, at least temporarily. The British will be out by the end of this month.
- e. The Soviets already seem eager to make contact with the new regime, and the South Arabians seem eager to receive their approaches.

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SOV. ARMS
MID EAST

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DCI BRIEFING FOR
RUSSELL SUBCOMMITTEESOVIET RE-SUPPLY OF MIDDLE EAST ARMS

I. We estimate that the Arabs lost \$400 to \$500 million in military equipment in the June fighting, and that the U.S.S.R. has now replaced about 250 million dollars worth of the losses.

A. This covers about all the fighter aircraft, perhaps half of the tanks, and some of the guns and vehicles lost. Moscow has made good about half of Egypt's bomber losses.

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B. The Soviets have also probably replaced the tanks and vehicles and aircraft which Algeria sent to Egypt,

C. In addition to replacing the few aircraft which Iraq lost,

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[] has recently supplied 18 jet fighter-bombers and ground forces equipment.

D. [] some Soviet military deliveries have taken place there, and at least a substantial portion of Syrian losses are believed to have been made up.

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III. Soviet military aid remains designed to expand Russia's influence and undermine that of the US.

A. Military aid has been provided carefully, however, in order to avoid stimulating pre-emptive moves by Israel and in an apparent effort to avoid the risk of provocative action by the Arabs.

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